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Abstract:
Law functions on the basis of some presuppositions of what a person is. The purposes and
tasks that are projected on a legal system depend on an understanding of personhood. Also,
courts continuously find themselves in situations where they have to define the person or the
legal subject, at times with surprising consequences. However, legal theory lacks clear
criteria for personhood. We do not know who or what a legal person is, nor do we know what
kind of being we want her to be. There is clearly a need for critical examination of the
concept of legal personhood. This article takes its inspiration from a historical theory, which
sheds light on the complex logics of subjectivity. Reflecting on the thought of Johann
Gottlieb Fichte we can contemplate fundamental aspects of personhood, especially in its
politico-legal dimensions. It is claimed in this article that even though the legal subject has to
be autonomous to some degree, acknowledging otherness inside the self is a compelling way
of understanding legal personhood.
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1. Introduction: people taking centre stage
The way we understand the human being is significant in law because it forms the basis for
our ideas of justice, equality, participation and rights, some of the permanent questions of law
and politics. The preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union says:
“Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible,
universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity […]. It places the
individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the Union and by
creating an area of freedom, security and justice.” This short announcement makes
individuals the centre of attention.2 It is evident that human rights argumentation receives
increasing attention in several legal systems today. In the EU, one most significant reason is
the European Court of Justice’s recent case law, where human rights have been given
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2 At the same time it refers to the establishment of citizens, who are the bearers of rights. The individual and the
citizen are not the same; indeed they are conceptually very different, depending on the philosophical tradition.
The relationship between individuality and citizenship has of course been theorised for ages. The subject, on the
other hand, usually denotes a human being as well as a political actor and/or subservient.
2growing importance. These developments indicate that at least in Europe, the human being is
sneaking its way to the centre stage of law.3 There is a fundamental shift of emphasis taking
place in Europe: where the Union was primarily concerned with trade and free movement, it
is now more and more explicitly attentive to the human beings who are its subjects (as both
actors and subservients). In the midst of this ongoing development it is worthwhile to take a
step back and consider the philosophical underpinnings of the legal human being. The value
of this analysis is that it can illustrate how we understand persons in law and perhaps also the
limits of what a person can be, according to legal thinking.
The conceptual linking between legal order and the human being understood as an
autonomous agent are numerous. Lon L. Fuller’s view is well known:
“To embark on the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of
rules involves of necessity a commitment to the view that man is, or can
become, a responsible agent, capable of understanding and following rules, and
answerable for his defaults. Every departure from the principles of the law’s
inner morality is an affront to man’s dignity as a responsible agent.” [13, p.
162].
Other similar ideas on human autonomy are common in jurisprudence. We find for instance
in Neil MacCormick’s work a clear interdependence between law and the autonomous
individual. He says that “[…] only an autonomous being can respond through acts of volition
to the requirements of normative order. For in the last resort only an autonomous being can
respond through acts of volition to the requirements of normative order.” [21, p. 128]. It
makes sense; law, in order to work, must assume that human beings are actors with at least
some will of their own, thus autonomous. Of course the connection between normative order
and individual autonomy is far from simple. The choices that people make will be responses
to the normative order. But the person making the choices will be influenced by that very
same order. MacCormick goes so far as to argue that “[i]n the development of moral agency,
heteronomy precedes autonomy” [21, p. 128]. Thus there can be no completely independent,
free or autonomous subject.4 MacCormick here alludes to a problematic idea that will be
discussed below in detail: in order for us to be autonomous selves, we are already permeated
3 ‘Sneaking’ because human beings do not tend to appear as such in legal practice. They are ‘persons’ when we
discuss for instance personal data or ‘claimants’, ‘defendants’, ‘consumers’, ‘judges’ etc. in other legal contexts.
4 See also Roger Cotterrell’s interesting discussion of human dignity and autonomy from a sociological point of
view in [9].
3by otherness. How should we understand a subject, who is conditioned by the normative
order but nevertheless autonomous? This problem is analysed below.
This article is guided by an awareness of the fact that there are problems with our present
understanding of legal subjectivity.5 We lack clear criteria for personhood.6 We do not know
in different legal situations who or what the legal person is, nor do we know what kind of
being we want her to be. Courts continuously find themselves in situations where they have
to define the human being in one way or the other, at times with surprising consequences.7
This article does not claim that there would be any clear criteria for defining personhood, nor
should we even look for them. The argument is much simpler: law always functions on the
basis of some presuppositions of what a person is (like). These presuppositions need to be
critically analysed.
One permanent difficulty is the tenuous relationship between participation and protection.
This issue is linked to two conflicting ways of understanding the human being: as a rational
and free agent on the one hand, and as an insecure and incoherent person on the other. A
current and highly relevant question in critical legal research concerns who has the right to
take part in law, and in what ways. Through demarcating those who have a legal voice in
society, the state (or some other institution with power) exercises inclusion and exclusion. It
is important to note that behind the cries for increasing opportunities for participation there
often lurks a conception of the human being as a self-conscious rational agent.8 If we, on the
other hand, emphasise protection instead of participation, then the human being we assume as
the legal subject looks different.9 The purposes and tasks that we require a legal system to
fulfil depend on our understanding of personhood. Naturally any evaluation of law’s success
is dependent on it as well. The legitimacy of law is tied to ideas of what it means to be
human. For instance according to Fuller, the legal system is flawed if it does not respect
people’s dignity because law is conceptually founded on the idea of people as responsible
agents.
5 On the importance of recognising subjectivity in law see [2].
6 See especially Ngaire Naffine’s interesting work on this topic in [23, 22].
7 For instance in the famous case R v. Sharpe the Supreme Court of Canada decided that imaginary human
beings can be regarded ‘persons’. See R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, 2001 SCC 2. The Court determined that
under the Canadian child pornography statute, they could lawfully convict someone of possession of child
pornography even though the sexually explicit depiction of a child was a fictionally constructed.
8 For a recent critical analysis of liberalism and agency, see [19].
9 See e.g. [3, 15].
4It might seem misleading referring to ‘the legal person’ or ‘legal subjectivity’ in general,
because the legal subject tends to appear in a myriad of forms. In EU law the concept
simultaneously refers to an active consumer, a citizen, a political actor and a person in need
of protection. However, it is assumed in this article that before we may analyse the diverging
forms of legal personhood in more detail, it is helpful to consider some philosophical ideas on
the human being. This article takes its inspiration from a historical theory that is not well
known nowadays, but sheds light on the complex logics of personhood. Reflecting on the
thought of Johann Gottlieb Fichte we can contemplate fundamental aspects of subjectivity,
especially in its politico-legal dimensions. By way of such reflection it might also become
possible to rethink the category of the legal subject, which the law assumes as one of its
constitutive concepts. The practical applications of such rethinking are, however, beyond the
scope of this article as they need to be dealt with in more detail than is possible here.
2. The thoroughly political subject
Fichte’s thought belongs firmly in the German idealist canon. He is also sometimes
connected with the Enlightenment, a movement he was of course an heir of [27, p. 3]. His
major influences derive from Kant but Fichte does not develop his theory in a direction that
could be called liberalist. His thought is preoccupied with the question of freedom, yet
Fichtean freedom is not your any old general principle, but a very complex idea with roots in
his accompanying theory of the subject. Amusingly, Isaiah Berlin lists Fichte as one of the
six enemies of human liberty [4, p. 50–73].
The standard account of liberalism presupposes the freedom of a self-conscious (and/or
rational) agent, who is at full liberty to choose the kind of life he or she wants to lead, and is
therefore responsible for his or her actions and omissions. Every individual is an autonomous
agent. What is interesting in Fichte’s account is the way his system combines an emphasis on
freedom with the idea of a subject who is not autonomous or self-sufficient. Indeed, for
Fichte, a subject’s freedom is conditioned by the existence of another human being.
The self-sufficiency and autonomy of the subject has been discussed recently by Slavoj
Žižek, who discerns foundational foreignness or otherness at the heart of the Cartesian
subject [29, p. xxiv]. According to Žižek, we can already find in the work of Kant and the
German idealists hints of the idea that the subject is somehow fragmented and not fully
5known to itself.10 Putting it crudely for the purposes of the theme at hand, we can locate the
Žižekian subject somewhere between the modern and the postmodern. A paradigmatic view
of a modern subject would be a conscious and rational agent, who decides to enter into a
constitutional agreement in order to form a government, or who negotiates the best possible
government behind a veil of ignorance. A postmodern subject would, in contrast, be
identified by a fundamental helplessness brought about by the lack of objective truths, clear
value systems and credible ideologies. He is no longer opaque to himself, nor conscious of
the motives for his actions. We can position Žižek’s view in opposition to these two
(simplified) depictions.
Žižek’s subject is thoroughly political.11 Political systems create ways of being human, so the
subject is never completely her own master. The subject is conditioned by otherness.
However, there is still something in the core of a human being that resists the power
structures that constitute it. The idea is that in order for the subject to be able to identify with
certain ways of being, that is, become constituted by the political systems, he or she has to
already have something or be something. Žižek conceptualises this something as a void or a
gap. The fundamental structure of human beings, the structure on which political subjectivity
is grounded, is a nothing that nevertheless exists [29, p. 348]. The subject is not completely
definable by outside forces but does contain an autonomous core of sorts. Yet this core is
nothing concrete or substantial [30, p. 145]. The way we are, the lives we want to live, the
values we hold dear are all imposed on us by powers structures beyond our control.
Interestingly, Žižek claims that Fichte was the first philosopher to concentrate on this
contingency at the very heart of subjectivity [30, p. 150]. In the light of the reading of Fichte
put forward here, it is easy to accept him as, if not the first, then one of the first thinkers who
acknowledges otherness in the heart of personhood. In his theory heteronomy and autonomy
form a complex relationship of mutual dependence.
A defining feature of late modern society is the denial of truth and the decreasing power of
shared traditions and common ideologies. Žižek makes the interesting point that we
sometimes still hold on to the idea of the modern subject as if it had not changed at all during
the turn from modernism to what has come later. The subject is still often conceived as a
10 See e.g. [29, p. 48–52, 68–72, 30, p. 140–189, 17, p. 10].
11 Žižek has been criticized for mixing a psychological analysis of human beings with an examination of social
structures and political organisation. He continuously steps across the border between the private and the public.
This is evidently a conscious move, as it seems that for Žižek there can be no individual without the social. See
[18, p. 86–87].
6rational free agent, who chooses his way of life, even though he no longer has a clear
authority by which to check his actions [29, p. 414]. Žižek asks whether the fact that the
subject has broken free of the chains of symbolic authority has led to an increase in
subjection. Western man’s freedom to choose his values, norms and world views brings with
it an increasing search for authoritative narratives of the good life and proper conduct. A
person always longs for masters and where she cannot find them she has to create them [29,
p. 418]. In this sense the present-day free subject is not as free as it would seem. The fact that
the meaning of an outside lawgiver has diminished does not automatically lead to the subject
taking more independent responsibility for his or her actions. This is channelled to the
juridical field in interesting ways: Žižek claims that people want a juridical authority (usually
a state) to take the role of leader and to free them from the burden and responsibility of free
choices [29, p. 440]. When we cannot or will not carry our own responsibility we are happy
to dispense with it and give the power to the state or other power regimes.12
This diagnosis of the present-day subject drawn from Žižek puts into question the freedom of
the human being [18, p. 88–89]. A contrast between a modern liberal position and a
postmodern one is not a sufficient framework for understanding the societal existence of the
human being. Subjects today are symbolically free but suffer from this freedom and are in
need of an outside lawmaker. On the concrete level they are, however, often trapped in their
circumstances and the power structures that uphold them.
Fichte’s theory of the human being is interesting because even though he followed Kant and
developed an account of the subject where self-determination is firmly attached to freedom,
in his version the subject is never his own master. In accordance with the liberal tradition,
freedom is the basis on which selfhood rests, but what is interesting in Fichte’s system is that
he constructs his theory without forgetting the other – on the contrary, the other plays a most
important role. A subject’s self-consciousness presupposes another person. Fichte’s theory
can even be compared with the way Emmanuel Levinas conceptualises the relationship
between the I and the other. To juxtapose these two theories may seem peculiar. What an odd
couple! We can situate them in two groups of theory, of which the first underlines the self-
presence and omnipotence of the subject and the second denies these very features, claiming
that there is necessarily otherness at the heart of the human subject. Nevertheless, as we shall
12 For instance, in many states the relationship between courts and the people is defined in the constitution in a
way that indicates that the courts function in the name of the people. For a fairly recent European analysis, see
[10, p. 201].
7see, it is rather difficult to find a place for Fichte in such a classification. His system is one of
the first examples of a theory in which the centre of gravity of the subject is put into question.
This makes his philosophy extremely interesting, because it shows the roots of the kind of
thinking where the self-knowledge and independence of human beings is challenged.
3. Fichte’s almost autonomous subject
In order to understand the many nuances of Fichte’s conception of the human being, an
unprejudiced reading of his theory is necessary. Fichte is a system-builder. He sees his own
philosophical system as a system of freedom. “My system is the first system of freedom. Just
as France has freed man from external shackles, so my system frees him from the fetters of
things in themselves …” [11, p. 385].13 Fichte measures up to the picture of the philosopher
who wants to construct a consistent and comprehensive account of the topics he studies, a
totality whose seams fit seamlessly into the fabric. Fichte calls his system Wissenschaftslehre,
which can perhaps best be translated as “doctrine of science” or “doctrine of knowledge” [31,
p. 2, 26, p. vii]. It is a transcendental theory very much influenced by Kant, whose work
Fichte admired.
Fichte presented his theory for the first time in 1794–1795 in a work titled Foundations of the
Entire Wissenschaftslehre. He was, however, displeased with the text and later published
several rewritings of it in different forms. He also developed extensions and applications of
the theory, among them an exposition of ethics and a theory of natural right. These entail
expansions of the system into social and political domains. I shall give an overall presentation
of Fichte’s understanding of the human subject, concentrating mainly on the Foundations of
Natural Right According to the Principles of the Wisseschaftslehre (1795–1796).14 This work
is not only an interesting attempt to give an account of the basic features of subjectivity, but it
also concerns the relationship between the subject and its others. The possessive pronoun is
of importance here because, as we shall see, his theory describes the relation between the
subject and otherness as always oriented from the subject towards others. The subject is the
essential foundation both for himself and his other.
13 Here we see what Fichte’s aim is and we can also notice the Kantian context in which he writes. Things in
themselves are the main problem of philosophy and developing a way to explain them (away) is Fichte’s goal.
14 This work of Fichte’s takes part in his early (Jena-period) philosophy. Fichte’s later versions of the
Wissenschaftslehre differ from this on several points. See e.g. Daniel Breazeale on the way Fichte’s theory
changed in [5, p. 1–49].
8Fichte starts his discussion with an analysis of rationality. A rational being is defined by the
fact that it is an I, a subject, which means that it is self-conscious. This presupposes an
activity that has its ground in the rational being itself. Fichte calls it one of the conditions of
self-consciousness: there has to be an activity that reverts into itself or has its ground in the
rational being itself. In addition, self-consciousness requires that the I or the rational being is
limited, determinate and posited by itself in reflection [12, p. 18–21]. These very abstract
definitions are the foundation on which Fichte builds his theory in the work. Being the basic
assumptions on which the argumentation rests, they form a significant part of the theory and
shall therefore be dealt with in some detail here.
Self-consciousness and rationality are connected in a profound way. He says in the
introduction of the work that “[t]he rational being is only insofar as it posits itself as being,
i.e. insofar as it is conscious of itself” [12, p. 4]. Thus rationality necessarily presupposes
self-consciousness. It seems to follow from this that there cannot be a rational being that is
not conscious of itself. In addition, for the self to be self-conscious, there must be something
outside the self, a ‘not-I’. This term is meant to refer to everything that exists outside of the I,
that is, what is distinguished from the I and opposed to it [11, p. 147]. There have to be
objects other than the subject “for we cannot posit ourselves without positing something
outside us, to which we must ascribe the same reality we attribute to ourselves” [12, p. 39].
One of Fichte’s main presuppositions is that subjectivity necessarily entails intersubjectivity.
The subject cannot be a subject without there being an other. “The human being (like all
finite beings in general) becomes a human being only among human beings; and since the
human being can be nothing other than a human being and would not exist at all if it were not
this – it follows that, if there are to be human beings at all, there must be more than one.”
[12, p. 37]. According to Fichte, the subject has to posit other rational beings in order for it to
be able to posit itself. The argument goes as follows: we are conscious of ourselves as
rational beings. In order for this to be possible there has to be something that “awakens” this
self-consciousness. This something cannot be an object. It has to be another rational self-
conscious subject that makes us aware of ourselves as rational self-conscious subjects. The
other being summons the subject to exercise its efficacy (influence, action). We see that in
this theory a mirror is needed to show us what we are and in order to work, this mirror has to
be of the same kind as we are. The existence of the other is the ultimate ground for the
existence of the I. The subject is conditioned by the other.
9To be precise, Fichte says that we should not think of the I as a product of the not-I. Rather,
what he means to say is that the I can never be conscious of himself unless there is something
outside the I and this something is a rational being like himself [11, p. 147]. Thus Fichte is
strict in the way he defines the subject: its most important feature is its autonomy. But even
though he holds on to the idea of an autonomous self he gives the other an important role in
awakening the self-consciousness of the self. He says that individuality is something shared.
“[T]he concept of individuality is a reciprocal concept, i.e. a concept that can be thought only
in relation to another thought, and one that (with respect to its form) is conditioned by
another – indeed by an identical – thought. This concept can exist in a rational being only if it
is posited as completed by another rational being. Thus the concept is never mine; rather, it is
– in accordance with my own admission and the admission of the other – mine and his, his
and mine; it is a shared concept within which two consciousnesses are unified into one.” [12,
p. 45].
4. The Fichtean subject in a community
Fichte does not end with the idea that there has to be more than one human subject. The
subject is not simply conditioned by the other in an abstract way. The summoning of the
other brings with it some content as well. The I and the other stand in a relation. Hence the
subject cannot posit other human beings without standing in a particular relation with them.
What is, then the relation between people like? In Foundations of Natural Right Fichte
defines this relation as the relation of right. The idea is that the subject is conditioned by the
other not only in general but in a rather specific way: the other’s existence defines the
subject’s sphere of activity. This means that the other’s existence marks the area where a
subject has room to manoeuvre. The subject’s independence and freedom are limited by the
other but inside his or her own sphere of activity the subject is an absolutely free being [12, p.
39–40]. The result is that every subject’s realm of freedom emerges simultaneously as the
subject presumes the freedom of another. Everyone is free inside his or her own sphere and
each also grants the freedom of the other. The subject and the other therefore summon each
other to act freely.
As individuality is simultaneously intersubjectivity, this leads to the idea that a community
follows naturally from the nature of the human being. According to Fichte: “The concept of
individuality determines a community, and whatever follows further from this depends not on
me alone, but also on the one who has […] entered into community with me.” [12, p. 45]. All
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people can be present to the I only in the same manner as the other. Interestingly, there is
reciprocity in this structure. As I posit myself as an individual, I also expect others to
recognise me as a rational being. The other’s mirror is me but I am also the mirror for the
other and both of us realise that we mirror each other. The argument starts off from self-
positing but moves on to the positing of another rational human being and further to their
positing me as such a being [12, p. 47–48].
It is on the importance of others and the community that Berlin strongly disagrees with
Fichte. “…Fichte gradually adopts the idea that the individual himself is nothing, that man is
nothing without society, that man is nothing without the group, that the human being hardly
exists at all.” [4, p. 67]. Berlin’s interpretation is to the point because we can clearly see a
strong emphasis on other people and the community in Fichte’s theory of the subject. His
theory is not one that develops an autonomous human being as the bearer of rights and duties.
What is, then, the status of other person’s in Fichte’s theory? It is indeed intriguing. The other
of Fichte’s subject is his or her other. Otherness is not only a prerequisite for the I’s self-
consciousness but a projection that the I makes. Nevertheless, Fichte points out that the other
subject resists the I. This structure where the two subjects meet is the foundation for rights.
As the I has to be free in order to be an I at all, when encountering another similar being it
realises that this other I has to be free as well. There is freedom against freedom and herein
the limits of the subject emerge. The other person’s freedom means that the other person has
rights and these restrict the ways that I can treat him. This is the reason why Fichte calls the
relation between free beings, which he deduces from the concept of the individual, the
relation of right. Rights are a necessary feature of being human. He deduces these rights from
the nature of man and thus aims to show their universality.15 As the individual is always
necessarily self-conscious, Fichte claims that the concept of right is a condition of self-
consciousness [12, p. 49]. In this way he endeavours to deduce the concept of right from the
I.16
Fichte does underline the ultimate freedom of man but that freedom is always restricted by
the freedom sphere of other individuals. To be a subject you need to be aware of yourself.
15 Or, as Herbert puts it, rights are not grounded upon human nature or natural law but should rather be
understood as necessary preconditions of self-consciousness. See [16, p. 207].
16 Herbert argues that Fichte’s aim was to develop an account of natural rights that finds a firm foundation for
them without denying their absolute character. His stance underlines the importance of the human being and his
rights in contrast to the good of society. In his theory there is no contradiction between freedom and respect for
the rights of other people because freedom exists only through a reciprocal acknowledgement of the freedom of
others in a community [16, p. 202–203].
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Nevertheless, the self-consciousness or self-presence of the subject is not pure individuality
but includes intersubjectivity. A subject is simultaneously present to itself but not owned by
itself. It requires otherness to be what it is.17 Thus the Fichte’s subject is never a pure,
autonomous individual. There is otherness already in the transcendental conditions that make
man what he is.
Is it still valid to see Fichte’s theory as an enemy to freedom as Berlin does? Yes and no.
There is no easy answer because Fichte’s thought is ambivalent on this point. In his own
view, self-determination is an element of freedom and to some extent the human subject is
determined by itself.18 However, for a person to be a conscious individual, an outside
influence is necessary. Here we can sense a contradiction. Fichte claims that the influence on
the person cancels his free activity to some degree but at the same time he argues that this
influence is attributed by the person to himself. The limitation of his freedom stems from his
freedom. He ends up saying that a person’s free activity is both cancelled and not cancelled
[12, p. 58–59]. The idea is that the rational individual is limited, but this limitation is a self-
limitation: “there can be no influence on the subject at all, unless the subject, through his own
freedom, accepts the impression that has been made upon him and internally imitates it. […]
It is precisely such self-limitation that is the exclusive criterion of reason.” [12, p. 62].
This account clearly includes problems. Fichte also has to explain how people can be free and
independent and still live in a community influenced by one another. The question is: how
can a person both be independent and dependent on others at the same time? To get out of
this tangle we need to think of freedom in a new way and this is what Fichte does. The
solution to the contradiction lies at the very heart of his theory of the I: the community is
grounded on the self. Fichte says that “the free being, by his mere presence in the sensible
world, compels every other free being, without qualification, to recognize him as a person.”
[12, p. 79]. Freedom presupposes reciprocal interaction between individuals and vice versa.
A person recognises the other person as a free being, not as a thing. From this Fichte deduces
the law of right which says us to limit our freedom so that the other alongside us can also be
free. The law is necessary in a community of free beings and, according to Fichte, whoever
wills such a community must necessarily will this law. However, Fichte underlines that this
17 See Jean-Luc Nancy’s interesting discussion of self-presence in [24, p. 8]. Nancy does not see the fact that the
subject is present but not present to himself as a contradiction. He says that “I can find no other name for this
than the name of ‘freedom’. Not freedom as the property of the subject (‘the subject is free’), but freedom as the
very experience of coming into presence […]”. To understand Freedom as the very basis of the way a subject is
present is an idea that bears a resemblance to Fichte’s.
18 See [25, especially p. 134–142, 167–171].
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law is willed and chosen freely. In order for the law to apply, everybody must make it a law
for himself [12, p. 82–84].19 Here we see that even though a person can be self-conscious only
through recognition of the other person, both are free agents with a choice to respect the
other’s freedom or not. There is nothing that compels a person to behave in such a way as not
to interfere with or even annihilate altogether the freedom of others.
There is another problem with Fichte’s theory that has to be considered before we can get a
full picture of it. If the I is first and foremost a self-positing activity, then how does it
acknowledge the other in the first place? Günter Zöller ponders this question through asking
what makes the I stay open to something other than its self-positing. To put it in a slightly
different way, why does the I need the other in the first place? Zöller concludes that it is
simply an essential feature of the I that it is open to otherness. Only when the I posits itself as
something, as being determinate (and thus finite), can it be self-conscious. An infinite
absolute being cannot be conscious of itself as something. The not-I functions as a check in
this process [31, p. 52–53]. Therefore, the I needs the not-I in order to see itself as something
because in this way there is something that resists the I and limits it defining the I as
something determinate. This is the idea of the mirror again: the other rational human being
functions as a mirror that shows the I what it is.
Fichte’s theory of rights includes an interesting paradox. Is it possible to violate rights? The
argumentation is founded on the idea that rights are dependent on mutual recognition. The
violation of rights would imply that there is no mutual recognition. But without mutual
recognition there are no rights and thus nothing to violate [16, p. 218]. Thus it would seem
that it is logically impossible to violate rights. However, if we interpret Fichte in a way that
allows the foundation of rights to be of a normative character this contradiction can be eased.
Mutual recognition that leads to respect for the other’s freedom and rights would thus be a
normative demand that Fichte places on us. In this way, violation of rights and lack of mutual
recognition would result in the same thing: an offence against the way we are supposed to
behave. Through such a reading the separation between the is (transcendental conditions for
personhood) and the ought (our responsibility to respect the rights of others) become blurred.
This does not necessarily make Fichte’s theory a failure; rather, such a creative reading
makes him more postmodern than modern.
19 Fichte’s view is obviously a very human-centred one. He explicitly limits other beings such as animals from
the community. Everything that has a human shape, that is, the shape of a rational being is a possible subject of
right. Other beings are excluded and there can, according to Fichte, be no talk of the rights of such beings.
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On the level of the organised state Fichte’s theory of rights turns into contract theory. One
interesting detail in it is the question of the foreigner. Towards the end of the Foundations of
Natural Right Fichte elaborates on this theme under the heading of ‘cosmopolitan rights’. The
starting point for the discussion is that the citizen of a state has certain rights by virtue of a
contract between him and the state. But what are the rights of a foreigner who enters the
state’s territory? Fichte says that all positive rights are grounded on a contract but everybody
has nevertheless an original human right qua being a human in the first place. Even though
the foreigner does not have any contract with the state that he is entering he has the human
right which precedes all contracts: the right to be able to acquire rights. This right has to be
granted to everyone (with the exception of those who have expressly forfeited it through their
actions) [12, p. 333]. Therefore, even though the foreigner is not a citizen of the state he is
entering and thus does not have the positive rights that result from a contract with that state,
he is nevertheless justified in demanding that others deem it possible to enter into rightful
relations with him. This idea of the original right that people have everywhere Fichte calls
cosmopolitan right. “It is this right to go about freely on the earth and offer to establish
rightful connections with others that constitutes the right of a mere citizen of the world.” [12,
p. 333]. This right is unfortunately (for the foreigner) very narrow and gives the newcomer
only the right to seek relations with the citizens and the state where he arrives. The state is
entitled to ask the foreigner what he wants and even force him to explain himself. If he
refuses to do so he can be sent away. Also, if he explains his aims and is not accepted, then
the original right ceases to exist and he can likewise be rightfully expelled. He nevertheless
maintains his right to seek relations with another state. If, on the other hand, the foreigner is
accepted to enter the state, he becomes subject to the state’s laws and therefore receives all
the positive rights of its citizens [12, p. 334].20
To sum up the most important points so far we should especially notice two things. Firstly,
Fichte, even though a German idealist, is certainly a philosopher whose obsession with the
absolute and foundational freedom of the human being makes him easily identified with the
liberal(ist) tradition. Still, his system includes elements that are incompatible with some
liberalist views. Secondly, his theory of the person does not make the human being
completely self-centred, for one human being is necessarily conditioned by another. We see
20 See also [1, p. 38–39]. Balibar points out the noteworthy fact that the moment when Kant produces the
transcendental subject is the same historical moment when the subject understood as a person submitted to
monarchical power is replaced with the republican citizen defined by his rights and duties. We can see a similar
logic in Fichte’s thought: from the perspective of communities, persons are primarily understood as citizens.
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also that in his theory rights are natural and respect for the rights of the other person is
necessary in a community. Nevertheless, he does see these rights as tied to the state to such
an extent that an individual as such is only a bearer of the minimal right to acquire rights.
5. Where is ethics?
Is the Fichtean self-positing activity of the I connected with a moral obligation towards the
other? According to Daniel Brezeale, it entails a practical self-awareness that is both concrete
and particular. It is not an awareness of a general moral principle but includes a concrete duty
in a concrete situation. This duty pertains only to me as an individual I [6, p. 191]. If we read
Fichte in this way we can think of him deriving an absolute moral obligation from his theory
of the subject. The human subject becomes himself, a particular individual, through realising
his moral obligation towards the other. We can find elements in Žižek’s reading of Fichte that
would confirm some ethical significance in the very structure of Fichtean subjectivity.
According to Žižek, “The Anstoss, the primordial impulse that sets in motion the gradual self-
limitation and self-determination of the initially void subject, is not merely a mechanical
external impulse: it also points towards another subject who, in the abyss of its freedom,
functions as the challenge (Aufforderung) compelling me to limit/specify my freedom, that is,
to accomplish the passage from the abstract egotistic freedom to concrete freedom within the
rational ethical universe.” [30, p. 150].
This way of interpreting Fichte is tempting, but even if we endorsed it, we would still find his
system lacking in ethical content. For him, the subject is primary and ethics secondary. His
aim is to define the transcendental conditions for the rational human being. In Levinasian
ethics, for instance, the I exists in a world surrounded by things that are alien to it and
different from it. At a very primary level, the subject has experiences which lead it to
distinguish between itself and other things. The subject learns to live with these things that
are alien to it, to play with them, to control them, to use them. It can enjoy the things at its
pleasure. Thus far the subject looks remarkably Fichtean. According to Levinas, we have a
strong inclination to treat other things as either extensions of ourselves or as alien objects that
can be manipulated. We find in ourselves a primordial egocentrism. However, Levinas’s
important idea is that this picture is not applicable to the way we experience other persons.
He explains this in Totality and Infinity: “[t]he absolutely other is the Other. He and I do not
form a number. The collectivity in which I say ‘you’ or ‘we’ is not a plural of the ‘I’. I, you –
these are not individuals of a common concept. Neither possession nor the unity of number
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nor the unity of concepts link me to the Stranger.” [20, p. 39]. The other person is not
experienced as a thing or an object. When I meet the other for the first time, he is a stranger. I
do not know him, I cannot be sure who he is or what he is like. He inhabits an alien world of
his own. I can try to treat him as an object and to place him into my categories, but this means
that I would reduce his otherness.21 The other person resists the ways in which I take hold of
the world. He ‘escapes my grasp’ [20, p. 39].
Fichte’s account of the subject is constructed as an integral part of his epistemology. He is
looking for a foundation for knowledge. In addition, Fichte is an egophilosopher, but not a
full-blooded one. His understanding of intersubjectivity entails a push that nudges the subject
slightly off focus. The self is not completely self-centred but always interrupted by otherness.
This goes for Levinas as well. His view entails that the subject is always de-centred and torn
by the absolute and impossible demand that stems from the other. As also Žižek points out, the
Levinasian subject is never autonomous but split by the ethical call. This can be seen as a
paradox in the sense that the demand that the subject can never meet is what makes the
subject [30, p. 829]. A structurally similar logic is at play in Fichte’s thinking.
There is a highly important difference between the two thinkers, though. Fichte takes it for
granted that the other is the subject’s other, that is, the other is always secondary. The subject
comes first, which entails exactly the kind of egocentric attitude that Levinas tries to get away
from. In Levinasian terms we could claim that in Fichte’s theory everything returns and is
reduced to the same, even otherness. However, also for Fichte there can be no subject without
the other. In order to become a subject at all the subject has to posit the other. Fichte says that
it is not because one exists that one is what one is, rather “one is what one is because
something else exists in addition to oneself.” [11, p. 148]. Self-consciousness is impossible
without a not-I.
In contrast to Fichte’s theory, which primarily focuses on the person and his knowledge, for
Levinas the ethical dimension comes first. His philosophy is not constructed as a foundation
for knowledge but as an explanation of what it means to be human and to live with others.
The most remarkable difference between the two thinkers shows itself in the way they
understand the relation between the self and the other. Where Fichte underlines reciprocity
and equality Levinas stresses asymmetry and inequality. For Fichte it is important that the I
and the other respect each other’s freedom. Levinas thinks that the I ought to respect the
21 See [28, p. 11–20].
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otherness of the other, but what the other does is his affair. We are responsible for the other
no matter what.
The aim of the human subject is, according to Fichte, to become truly what he is and to fulfil
his duty. In Some Lectures concerning the Scholar’s Vocation, a short text comprising five
lectures that he gave in Jena in 1794,  he says that “[m]an is always supposed to be at one
with himself; he should never contradict himself.” [11, p. 149]. He goes on to state, in a
Kantian vein, that man is his own end and a person should always determine himself. He also
subscribes to a version of the categorical imperative, which highlights the feature of man as
his own lawgiver. Here too he is nevertheless quick to stress that even though the pure I is
self-identical and in complete agreement with oneself, the empirical I that we in fact are is
dependent on things external to us [11, p. 149]. It can be argued that through the distinction
between the absolute I and the empirical I Fichte wants to have his cake and eat it too. He
manages to hold on to the subject as an autonomous self-identical unity and at the same time
makes this subject determined on things foreign to it. He defines the highest good of man
thus: “the highest good is the complete harmony of a rational being with himself. In the case
of a rational being dependent upon things outside of himself, the highest good may be
conceived as twofold: as harmony between the willing [of such a being] and the idea of an
eternally valid willing (i.e., as ethical goodness), or as the harmony of our willing […] with
external things.” [11, p. 151]. Fichte strikes a balance here between the ultimate aim of our
being free and autonomous self-positing beings and things that are external to us. Man should
aim at harmony with himself but also with external things.
This idea of harmony is clearly a point at which Fichte’s and Levinas’s views are in
opposition. Levinas’s understanding of an ethical stance is completely conditioned by respect
for otherness. A Fichtean view implies that the ego takes hold of its surroundings thus
reducing these into aspects of his own experience and this reduction is something that
Levinas explicitly criticises. Taking hold of the other, reducing its otherness, bringing it
inside the sphere of the unity of the ego, is egoistic and unethical.
6. Conclusions: autonomy and the legal subject
What relevance can Fichte’s thinking have for legal theory today? It was set out in the
beginning of this article that our conception of the legal personhood and subjectivity
necessarily rests on some philosophical underpinnings. One of them is the idea of autonomy.
There are obvious difficulties with understanding human beings as autonomous. After Kant
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the picture of a self-satisfied subject started to crumble and Fichte may be the first
philosopher who develops the idea of a subject whose autonomy is preceded by heteronomy,
as MacCormick would put it. We have seen that in Fichte’s theory, as in the work of
Schelling after him, the subject becomes conditioned by otherness [14, p. 6–7]. In Fichte this
idea is only in its infancy, as he still holds on to the free and self-conscious subject. For him
the subject is an active and self-directing agent. Nevertheless, this subject cannot do without
the other person, because rational self-conscious personhood is dependent on an encounter
with another rational human being. Fichte provides a tentative answer to our guiding
question. He shows how a subject can be autonomous though permeated by otherness.
The idea of a free self-centred subject is the one that underlies legal thinking and to some
extent it probably has to be so. We often understand the legal in accordance with the liberal
tradition as a free rational agent who makes choices and is therefore able to carry
responsibility for his actions. This view may include an unrealistic picture of the human
condition in practice because we are not all equally fit or equally lucky to live our lives
exactly as we want. Still, it is very difficult to conceive the legal subject radically otherwise.
A Levinasian subject, for whom the other always comes first, is alien for modern legal
thought.
In law, every human being, even a child or a disabled one, is at least potentially an
autonomous agent. The self-present responsible subject is the same one who has made social
contracts through the history of political philosophy and is thus in essence the citizen, that is,
the creature who has rights and duties because of his participation in the community. This
view may be idealistic, because there are beings that tend to drop out, such as illegal
immigrants, who become non-subjects. Animals are of course another problematic group.
Nevertheless, the legal subject understood as an autonomous subject is what jurisprudence is
stuck with. But Fichte’s theory explains how autonomy is not the same as self-sufficiency,
nor does it entail complete self-mastery.
We can thus conclude that even though the legal subject has to be autonomous to some
degree, acknowledging otherness inside the self, which both Fichte and Levinas do in their
own ways, can be an alternative way of founding the legal subject. This idea has its benefits
because it does not force us into a position, according to which everybody is presupposed to
hold the keys to his happiness firmly in his own hands. If we take seriously the Fichtean idea
that the other is necessary for the existence of an I, this can have effects for our conception of
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responsibility and rights. We can never encounter the other person simply as foreign because
he or she is important to us in intricate ways. He or she is a fellow human being sharing
existence with us and making us what we are.
Judith Butler argues that it is precisely our opacity to ourselves that makes it possible for us
to confer a certain kind of recognition on others. If nothing else, the realization that one is not
completely the master of oneself and that there is something for which one cannot give
account might at least induce patience towards others. One would not expect other people to
be rational and self-conscious at every moment either. The idea is that when we understand
that we can never know ourselves completely, we realize that we cannot expect anything else
from others. Butler turns upside down the idea that a subject who is opaque to herself is
therefore not fully responsible for her actions. The fact that we are always interrupted by
alterity means that we are ethically implicated in the lives of others [7, p. 37, 8, p. 83–92].
There are ethico-political implications in seeing human beings as fundamentally void, lacking
and unknown to themselves. This understanding of personhood can be a conceptual
foundation for legal subjectivity that acknowledges autonomy preceded by heteronomy.
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